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ABSTRACT
An  important  yet  under-explored  question  in  the  teamwork  literature  concerns  how  group
characteristics affect productivity. Within a given teamwork setting, it is not obvious how group
member diversity affects the performance of the individual and the group. The group may gain from
knowledge transfer and sharing while it may be crippled by communication and coordination
problems that are prevalent in heterogeneous groups. In this study, we combine class performance
data from an undergraduate management class with students’ personal records to explore diversity
and knowledge spillover effects. A major advantage of our dataset is the exogenous assignment of
groups, which rules out the troublesome yet common self-selection issue in team literature. Our
results indicate that male-dominant groups performed worse both in group work and in individually
taken exams than female-dominant and equally-mixed gender groups after controlling for other
group characteristics. Individual members from a group with more diversity in age and gender scored
higher in exams. However, we did not find any significance of a group’s racial composition over
group and individual performances. Another novel aspect of this natural experiment is that each
group chooses their own group contract form – members of “autonomous” groups receive equal
grade for their group work while those in "democratic" groups can adopt differentiated point
allocation, thus, providing a proper mechanism to punish free riders. Our estimation results show
a significant correlation between the choice of a democratic contract and the group and individual
performance. To address the endogeneity problem in groups’ contract choices, we use a maximum
likelihood treatment effect model and found that the democratic group contract has a positive and
significant effect on group performance.
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There is a growing public interest in the impact of workforce diversity on firm 
performance.  When the US Supreme court reviewed the legality of affirmative action programs 
at the University of Michigan in the spring of 2003, 65 leading American businesses submitted a 
legal brief as Amici Curiae supporting the University’s policy, which argued: 
“In the practical experience of the Amici businesses, the need for diversity in higher 
education is indeed compelling.  Because our population is diverse, and because of the 
increasingly global reach of American business, the skills and training needed to succeed 
in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and 
viewpoints.  Employees at every level of an organization must be able to work effectively 
with people who are different from themselves.” 
1
 
Educators also have debated for decades about the educational value of racial and ethnic 
diversity since the US Supreme court of ruling in the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas in 1954 (See Appel, Cartwright, Smith and Wolf (1996); Chang (1999); Chang, Witt-
Sandis and Hakuta (1999) for a survey and examples of recent research).  Despite significant 
welfare and public policy implications of the debates about how diversity affects productivity in 
workplace and learning in schools, there has not been extensive theoretical or empirical research 
on the potential mechanisms of this possible linkage.  Furthermore, too much emphasis has been 
put on ethnic and racial diversity and other group characteristics such as age, gender and skill 
diversity, which can also be beneficial in workplace, have been left under-explored.  
 Researchers in the field of labor and organizational economics have assessed both the 
pros and cons of teamwork on productivity and have also explored the impact of team 
                                                 
1 See “Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents” in the case of Gratz v. 
Bollinger, University of Michigan, et al. (No. 02-516) and Grutter v. Bollinger, University of Michigan, et al. (No. 
02-241) submitted to Supreme Court of the United States by attorneys of Amici Curiae on February 18, 2003. composition on performance. Teamwork utilizes members’ comparative advantages and skill 
specializations and facilitates knowledge transfer, thus improving productivity.
2 On the other 
hand, free-riding
3 and coordination problems
4 arise and tend to hinder efficient operation of a 
team. Diversity may improve productivity through knowledge sharing and task coordination if 
diversity exists in skill dimensions or knowledge sets.  Non-skill-related demographic diversity, 
however, may harm productivity by raising communication costs and making peer pressure less 
effective.  Evaluating the effect of diversity on overall performance thus requires careful 
empirical examination of how group characteristics can change the tradeoff between the benefits 
and costs of teamwork by affecting the way in which group members interact with each other.  
Such relationships are likely to be dependent on specific contexts, namely, the nature of 
technology, the institutional environment and other practices adopted in the workplace.   
Therefore, the first step to analyze the relationships is to measure the effectiveness of group work 
and understand the specific context in which groups are operating. Unfortunately, empirical 
research on teamwork in different contexts is scarce.   
  Several factors have contributed to the absence of empirical research on the relationship 
between workforce diversity and productivity. First, group-level or work-unit-level data are 
needed to compare productivity with group characteristics.  Such data are usually hard to obtain 
due to the lack of systematic record of group activities either in educational or work 
environments.  As a result, the effect of workforce diversity on performance has been empirically 
examined mostly using aggregated statistics at the industry or firm level (e.g. Heckman and 
                                                 
2 Some of these gains or tradeoffs among the benefits of teamwork are discussed in Lazear (1999) and Garicano 
(2000). 
3 For a thorough discussion of free-riding, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982), and Kandel and 
Lazear (1992). Free-riding problems arise especially when team members’ actions are unobservable or team 
members do not have means to punish free-riders (e.g. social pressure). 
4 For a theoretical model of how coordination costs affect the degree of specialization, see Becker and Murphy 
(1992).  
 Payner (1989), Leonard (1984), Conrad (1995), Holzer and Neumark (2000)). One exception is 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003, 2004) where detailed data on worker productivity and 
demographic information from a garment factory are used to analyze the effect of the change in 
the factory work organization and pay scheme from individual piece rate to team piece rate.  
Second, even with available data set, there are further challenges in correctly identifying team 
effects or peers effects, mostly due to the self-selection problem. Unless randomly assigned, 
subjects of teams usually self-select into teams or groups. For example, workers might self-select 
into teams with members from same ethnic background or with members of similar productivity 
level; students (or their families) self-select into districts, schools, or classes based on their 
capabilities and expectations. 
  In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence that age and 
gender diversity matter in group performance and group learning in certain team environments.  
We do not find any significant effect of ethnic or racial  diversity on performance. We use class 
performance data from an undergraduate introductory management course and the students’ 
personal records from the registrar’s office at a private US university to analyze diversity and 
knowledge spillover effects.  Individual-level performance is measured by the scores on three 
exams while group-level performance is assessed by the grades on group homework and other 
group projects.  A major advantage of our dataset is the exogenous assignment of groups, which 
rules out the troublesome yet common self-selection issue in team literature.  
According to our results, male-dominant groups performed worse both in group work and 
in individually taken exams than female-dominant and equally-mixed gender groups, after 
controlling for other group characteristics.  Individual members from a group with more diversity 
in age and gender scored higher in exams.  We also find that younger students and those students with high SAT scores benefit more from gender diversity while older students and students with 
low SAT scores benefit more from age diversity.   
We also contribute to the contract literature by demonstrating that the governance choice 
by group members can have a significant impact on group performance.  In our classroom 
setting, the role of governance form is to create the expectation that free-riding behavior may be 
punished by peers.  Each group chooses their own group contract form – members of 
“autonomous” groups receive equal grade for their group work while those in "democratic" 
groups can adopt differentiated point allocation approved by the majority of the members thus 
providing a proper mechanism to punish free riders and reward hard workers.  Our OLS 
estimation results show a significant correlation between the choice of a democratic contract and 
the group and individual performance.  Because the same unobservable factors that influence 
group performance may also influence a group’s contract choice, we adopted treatment effects 
maximum likelihood estimation method to deal with the endogeneity problem. We asked 
teaching assistants (TAs) whether they discussed the positive aspects of the democratic group 
contract and talked about their positive experience with the contract during the small-class 
sessions led by TAs when groups were asked to select their group contracts.  Then, we used the 
TAs’ responses to the question as an instrument in the first stage and found a significant positive 
impact of the democratic group contract on the group performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature; 
Section 3 introduces the content and structure of group work in the introductory management 
class; Section 4 explains data and variables constructed; Section 5 discusses empirical analysis of 
the data; Section 6 concludes. 
 II. Literature 
Sociology and psychology have a long history of studying the effects of diversity. In 
various studies, the word diversity has been used to describe many types of differences among 
people.  Organizational behavior researchers mostly focused on characteristics of group 
composition that are salient such as age, race, and gender (See Kanter 1977, Konrad and Gutek 
1987, Bantel and Jackson 1989, Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly 1992, Stangor, Lynch, Duan and Glass 
1992, Cummings, Zhou, and Oldham 1993, Rothbart and John 1993, Pelled 1996, Williams and 
O’Reilly 1998 for theoretical frameworks and survey).  Visibility is important when people use 
these characteristics to categorize others and form expectations for their behavior based on the 
categorization.  Decision-making researchers, however, typically define diversity in terms of 
variation in expertise or information (See Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, and Neale 1996, Stasser, 
Stewart, and Wittenbaum 1995, Wittembaum and Stasser 1996, Robinson and Dechant 1997 for 
example for some leading works and survey).  There are two major difficulties in the study of 
diversity. First, it is prohibitively difficult in most contexts to separate the effect of salient 
demographic differences from those differences in other, but likely correlated personal attributes 
such as ability, knowledge, and personality.  As a result, it is often not feasible to identify the 
mechanism that mediates the effect of diversity.  Second, in order to identify the mediating 
mechanism, most studies focus on a particular group process such as commitment, 
communication, and conflict.  As a result, these studies in organizational behavior and 
psychology generally fail to derive clear implications for the overall impact on the group 
performance.   Mannix and Neale (2005) describe the current state of diversity research in their 
survey as follows: As we disentangle what researchers have learned from the last 50 years, we can conclude 
that surface-level social category differences, such as those of race/ethnicity, gender, or 
age, tend to be more likely to have negative effects on the ability of groups to function 
effectively.  By contrast, underlying differences, such as differences in functional 
background, education, or personality, are more often positively related to performance—
for example, by facilitating creativity or group problem solving—but only when the 
group process is carefully controlled.  The majority of these effects have typically been 
explained in terms of potential mediators such as social integration, communication, and 
conflict.  However, the actual evidence for the input-process-output linkage is not as 
strong as one might like. 
 
Some evidence for the “economic” value of diversity in both demographic and non-
demographic dimensions can be found in Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003, 2004).  They 
find a significant impact of skill diversity on team productivity: teams with more heterogeneous 
composition in member’s individual skill level were more productive holding other 
characteristics constant.
5  They also show that both age and ethnic diversity had slightly negative 
effects in team productivity, but these effects became insignificant once team fixed effects were 
included. These results could indicate higher communication costs in demographically diverse 
teams.  The negative effects of diversity on communication among employees have been noted 
by a couple of studies.  Zenger and Lawrence (1989) examined the effects of age diversity on 
technical communication and found a negative correlation between age heterogeneity and 
                                                 
5 They also find that the most able team member had more influence over team productivity than the least able team 
member.  Two explanations were offered: (1) knowledge possessed by the most able workers was most broadly and 
most effectively shared among team members and (2) the high-productivity member had stronger bargaining power 
in setting the work pace because participation in teamwork was voluntary. frequency of technical communication.  Hoffman (1985) also found that increasing black 
representation among supervisors in the federal government offices was negatively associated 
with interpersonal communication.  Ethnic diversity could also affect the trust or effectiveness of 
peer pressure.  In a field study conducted by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) on the 
productivity of fruit farm workers in a teamworking environment, workers cooperated more in a 
smaller groups with co-workers who had the same nationality.  
One important finding in our paper is the significant role of gender composition on both 
group and individual performances.  The finding that gender diversity has a favorable impact on 
group performance and learning is striking.  Other work has found that gender heterogeneity led 
to a higher level of conflicts (Alagna, Reddy and Collins (1982), Pelled (1997)), a lower 
performance in some cognitive team activities (Clement and Schiereck (1973)), and less creative 
works (Kent and McGrath (1969), Hoffman, Harburg and Maier (1962)).  The only exception is 
Hoffman and Maier (1961) where sex diversity improved the quality of the groups’ solutions on 
five cognitive tasks in their study of 41 four-person groups.      
Also related to our study is the literature on peer effects. In the field of education 
research, whether students are affected by the achievement of their classmates has long been of 
great interest.  If peer effects exist, group composition in terms of skill and knowledge levels 
should matter for the performance of individual students.  Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2002) 
consider classes of a medical school as the units of peer groups and used students’ MCAT scores 
as the outcome variable to test peer effects. The formation of such peer groups was highly 
endogenous since students’ choices in school applications depend mainly on their ability and 
preferences. Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2002) find that the average ability (measured by 
average MCAT scores of the school) of a medical student’s peer group did not affect the student’s board score when school fixed effects were used. In her study of peer effects in 
elementary school classrooms, Hoxby (2000) deals with self-selection problem by using 
exogenous variations in peer group composition – changes in gender and racial compositions of a 
grade in a school over adjacent years. She finds positive and significant peer effects on a 
student’s performance on standard tests, and such effects appeared to be stronger inside a racial 
group than among racial groups. 
The literature on workforce and school diversity (in race and ethnicity) often implicitly 
assumes that: (1) diversity in demographics naturally generates various sets of knowledge and 
perspectives; and (2) diverse sets of knowledge and perspectives can be effectively used to raise 
productivity. Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2003), for example, test the hypothesis that a diversified 
student body in college contributes to the accruement of “diversity capital”
 6 and improves the 
students’ post graduate labor market outcomes, which are measured by earnings, postgraduate 
education level and individual’s subjective evaluation of life and employment satisfaction.
7 They 
find no positive effect of collegiate diversity on above outcomes for an individual
8.  
Empirical studies in higher educational environment show that peer effect may  be 
expressed differently in female peer groups and in male ones (see for example, Arcidiacono and 
Nicholson (2002)).  Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) conducted controlled experiments to 
test both genders’ productivity changes when the working environment shifted from a non-
competitive one (piece rate payment scheme) to a competitive one (tournaments). Significant 
                                                 
6 Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2003) introduced the concept of “diversity capital” which measures an individual’s 
ability to generate surplus in interacting with other agents from different ethnic, racial, or socioeconomic 
backgrounds. 
7 In order to control for unobservable factors and possible sorting phenomenon, Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2003) 
assume that racial diversity could vary significantly within an institution and controlled for both college and major 
fixed effects. 
8 Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2003) provide several interpretations for their empirical result: First, “diversity capital” 
may not exist or at least does not play an important role in college education. Second, since students are more likely 
to interact with peers with similar college preparation levels, diversity capital may be accumulated only in colleges 
where knowledge levels across racial groups overlap to some extend. gender gap, with men performing better than women, was observed in a competitive 
environment even though such gender difference did not occur under non-competitive 
environment.
9   These findings may imply that women respond differently to teamwork 
environments and governance.   
Finally, our study of how the group governance form affects the group performance could 
be evaluated in comparison with other works on team incentive pay.   In their study of a garment 
factory, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) find that workers’ productivity improved 
significantly after a team production system with team pay replaced the traditional individual 
piece rate scheme. Different results were obtained in the study conducted by Bandiera, Barankay 
and Rasul (2005) - productivity of workers from a UK fruit farm was observed both in teams 
with a relative pay scheme
10 and under individual piece rate scheme.  Individual productivity 
was significantly lower under teamwork with relative pay scheme than under individual piece 
rates.  Workers withheld production cooperatively to avoid a decrease in piece rate, internalizing 
the negative externality their efforts impose on others.  Finally, Knez and Simester (2001) find 
that the incentive bonus program based on a firm-wide performance goal introduced at 
Continental Airlines raised employee performance despite the threat of free-riding- possibly due 
to mutual monitoring facilitated by autonomous work groups.    
                                                 
9 In a similar study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2002) administered experiments to test gender differences in young 
children’s running performance in a competitive environment and found that competition increased boys’ 
performance more than girls’ performance; moreover, a girl’s running improved only after being paired to compete 
with a boy (instead of a girl). 
10 Workers were paid according to their relative fruit picking rate as compared with the average picking rate of their 
team. Thus, even a low productivity worker was paid well if his team’s overall productivity was low. III. Group Work in Management 100 
We study the effect of group composition and knowledge spillovers on individual and 
group performance using class performance data from an undergraduate introductory 
management course (MGT100) that two of the co-authors taught during 2001 – 2004 in Olin 
School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis. MGT 100 is a course designed to offer 
a thematic introduction to the world of business and to provide an overview of many key 
economic concepts covered by various business courses including equilibrium, efficiency, 
competition, monopoly, asymmetric information, externalities, transaction costs, asset 
specificity, human capital, strategic positioning, product differentiation, commitment, etc.  The 
course is required for all business-major and business-minor students and its instruction format 
has been largely constant over time.  All entering business-major students as well as other 
interested freshmen from other schools take the course together in a large auditorium in the fall 
of their first year. MGT100 typically has an enrollment of 150 to 200 students in the fall 
semester of each year. Students with a minor in business and students who are transferring to the 
business school generally take the course in spring semesters. The course, which was initially an 
elective for business-minor students, became a required course as a part of the curriculum reform 
beginning with the class of 2004.  This change caused the class size in spring semesters to grow 
in our observation period from around 40 to 100.   
In addition to attendance in lectures at regularly scheduled class hours, MGT100 requires 
participation in discussion sessions every Friday where teaching assistants (TAs) lead 
discussions and run classroom games in small subsections of 12 to 26 students. In the first 
scheduled discussion session, TAs assign students in their subsections into four or five member 
teams. TAs are instructed to maintain gender diversity as much as possible in appointing groups although the actual method of team assignment is left to TAs. Most tend to divide students into 
groups based on alphabetical order.
11   Despite this instruction, gender makeup varies 
substantially in groups due to differences in gender composition within and across subsections 
and due to the attrition of group members after the first week.  When students drop the course 
after the first week, we may have teams with only three or even two members.
12    
  MGT100 requires a substantial amount of group work including three assignments and a 
group project.  The group work requirement in the course accounts for 28 percent of total course 
grade.  For their group project, each group selects one of the business books listed by the 
instructor (or a substitute approved by the instructor) on which to write a paper and to make an 
oral presentation.
13  Students are instructed to use course concepts in their paper to analyze the 
market environment of the firm, to discuss features of the firm as a response to the market 
environment, and to examine the strategic options that are available to the firm.  This group 
project is completed by the end of the semester.  Since instructors show students the evaluation 
forms used in grading of their group projects at an early stage of their work, students know how 
their work will be evaluated before they actually start writing their papers and preparing for oral 
presentation.  The evaluation forms were not changed during our observation period; thus, the 
same evaluation criteria were applied to all five classes in our sample. In addition, each group 
also works together on three assignments during the semester.  Despite the relatively heavy 
workload, each assignment is allocated only one-percentage weight of the total course grade and 
it is graded only as "satisfactory" (1 point) or "unsatisfactory" (0 point).
14  Groups are given one 
                                                 
11 This method does not seem so troublesome for our research purpose unless the distance in the alphabetical order is 
correlated with social connections.    
12 There were three 2-member groups (out of 102 groups). 
13 In fall 2004, they were Liar's Poker (Salomon Brothers); Hard Landing (airline industry); Swoosh (Nike); The 
Merck Druggernaut; McDonalds Behind the Arches; and getting the bugs out (Volkswagen). 
14 The reasons for the low weight on homework assignments are explained to the students as follows: first, problems 
similar to those in the homework will appear in the exams and, therefore, the students who work hard on the chance to re-do their homework if they receive an unsatisfactory grade in the first grading.  A 
typical time frame of the group work is presented in Table 1. 
  Clear logical and analytical thinking, a deep understanding of class concepts and good 
exam preparation and taking skills are necessary and largely sufficient for successful 
performance in exams in MGT100, but success in group work requires somewhat different and 
additional capabilities.  The group paper requires good writing skills in addition to understanding 
and applying class concepts to a specific firm and industry. The group presentation necessitates a 
lot of practice and speaking at ease in front of an audience. Most importantly, successful 
completion of the group project requires responsibility to meet regularly, effective organization, 
coordination and communication among group members and good time management skills. 
Regularly assigned group homework entails long hours of hard work, and is very useful for 
understanding of class concepts and for exam preparation.  
A novel aspect of the group work in MGT100 is that each group selects one of the 
following three team organizational structures to run and manage its team throughout the 
semester: autonomous team, democratic team, or manager-led team.  The choice of the 
organizational form defines the set of voting rules that team members must follow to coordinate 
their actions. A “consensus-based” autonomous team requires that all decisions made within the 
team receive unanimous support and all team members are awarded the same grade for their 
group projects. A “majority rule-based” democratic team requires that all decisions require 
majority (i.e., more than 50% of votes). The members of democratic team vote at the end of the 
semester on the allocation of grades to individual team members. A manager-led team assigns 
                                                                                                                                                             
assignments will be rewarded by good exam grades while those who shirk will be punished by bad exam outcome.  
Second, in case some members free-ride on the others’ work, low weight will help ease the stress caused by 
resentment.  But one substantial reason that the instructors do not tell students is that low weight discourages 
students from illegitimately obtaining the answers to homework assignments that are used every year with very little 
modifications.        coordination responsibility to one member who is elected by the team at the beginning of the 
course.  The manager evaluates other team-member contributions and assigns grades to team-
members at the end of the course.  Similarly, team-members evaluate their manager's 
performance at the end of the course and assign a grade to the manager.  The instructor assigns 
an overall grade for the group project, but individual grades of group members then can be 
modified by at most one letter grade, depending on the team structure adopted and team's self-
grading.
15  The differentiated point allocation rule allows the democratic and manager-led team 
group members to punish free-riders.  After TAs explain the rules of each team structure and 
discuss their implications, groups are asked to discuss and choose their team governance form in 
the second week of the semester.  When all members agree and sign the team contract, they 
cannot change their contract type under any circumstance.  If group members cannot reach the 




IV. Data Description 
In this paper, we utilize a novel data set constructed from academic and demographic 
records of 431 undergraduate students who took MGT100 over five semesters during 2001 – 
2004 (Spring 2001, Spring 2002, Spring 2003, Spring 2004, and Fall 2004). Our data include 
grade sheets that provide detailed information on students’ grades on two midterm exams and a 
final exam as well as group assignments and the group project that includes a paper and oral 
presentation. In addition, each student is matched to his or her corresponding group and each 
                                                 
15 For example, a team could receive a B (or 85 in the 100 point score) from the instructor.  If the team is 
autonomous, all members would receive a B (85) for the team project. If the four-member team is democratic or 
manager-led, one member could conceivably receive an A (95), two members a B (85), and one member a C (75).   
16 Classes in spring 2003 and 2004 were allowed to have one week extension when they were unable to reach 
agreement.  group’s contract choice (democratic, manager-led, or autonomous) is also recorded. We have 
102 student groups, out of which only 3 had chosen the manager-led group structure.  Since both 
manager-led and democratic groups adopt proper mechanisms to prevent free-riding and reward 
hard working members, groups that chose the manager-led contract type were categorized as 
democratic type group in our empirical analysis. Unfortunately, the group contract choice 
information is missing for the Spring 2002 class; thus the observations from this class (64 
individuals and 15 groups) were excluded from analysis whenever the contract choice variable 
was involved.  
We augmented the class performance data with the records we obtained on students’ 
academic and demographic backgrounds from the university registrar office.  Information on a 
student’s academic background includes: college status (freshman, sophomore, etc.) at the time 
of enrollment in MGT100, semester and cumulative GPA
17 prior to taking MGT100, SAT 
score
18, courses taken prior to MGT100, and the primary division
19 of the student. Demographic 
information consists of age, gender, ethnic origin, and housing location (living on or off 
campus).  
  Based on individual members’ information, we constructed several group level variables 
to measure demographic and knowledge/skill composition of groups. These group characteristic 
variables are used to analyze the effect of group composition on group performance and group’s 
contract choice. Most group level variables were constructed by taking the average and standard 
deviation of individual level variables for the group members. Thus, we created variables 
                                                 
17 In one of the classes (the Fall 2004 class), students enrolled in MGT100 were predominantly freshmen; thus no 
GPA information was available for these students and it was not used in our analyses. 
18 For those students who took ACT instead of SAT, the ACT scores were converted into SAT according to the 
Comparison Table provided by College Educational Board. The comparison table was constructed based on 103,525 
test-takers who took both SAT and ACT between October 1994 and December 1996. Equivalent SAT and ACT 
scores are those with the same percentile ranks for a common group of test takers. 
19 The primary divisions of the students in our sample pool are Schools of: Art and Sciences, Fine Art, Architecture, 
Business, and Engineering. measuring average age level in groups, average class status, group male and female dominance 
measures, average SAT levels, proportion of domestic Caucasian students in groups as well as 
standard deviations in age and in SAT scores in each group. Group age and status variables are 
used to indicate a group’s knowledge level and knowledge diversity. SAT scores at group levels 
are intended to capture group’s skill composition. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all 
the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
 V. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we analyze three issues regarding the benefits and costs of teamwork. 
First, we investigate whether and how a group’s composition affects its performance in group 
work. We focus on four measures of group composition: heterogeneity in gender, age, race and 
capabilities. We study whether heterogeneous groups perform better than comparable but more 
homogeneous groups. Heterogeneous groups may face setbacks caused by communication and 
coordination problems but they may also enjoy the benefits of an enhanced knowledge and skill 
set. Second, we address the extent of knowledge spillover from groups to their members. Which 
group characteristics contribute to learning and personal growth of individual members? Which 
individuals are likely to be benefited most from group learning? We answer these questions by 
analyzing the impact of group characteristics on exam performance of students. Finally, we 
investigate how a group’s governance structure may have affected its operation and performance. 
As discussed earlier, every group chose a form of governance shortly after group formation by 
signing one of the three types of contract.  We study what group characteristics were influential 
in a group’s contract decision, and how important the contract choice was in the performance of 
students in their group projects. We now address these issues in turn.  
A. How does group composition affect group performance? 
We first analyze the impact of group composition characteristics on group performance. 
We model the group performance as:  
                         (1)  jk k j j jk Class Dvsty X GroupScore ε α β + + + =  
Subscript j and k are the indexes for the j
th study group in the k
th semester. GroupScorejk 
is the group performance measure constructed by taking the weighted average of a group’s 
homework and project scores. Xj is a vector of control variables for group j including average age 
of members and average SAT scores of members. Classk is a vector of dummy variables to 
account for class fixed effects; including such fixed effects in the regression can control for 
factors including variations in two instructors’ grading standards. In addition, we constructed an 
indicator variable for groups with 5 members to control for the potential differences in group 
work within “large” groups.  While estimating all our models, we used the demeaned forms of 
age, SAT scores, and their averages to avoid reporting distorted coefficient estimates for other 
variables that are used in interaction terms with age and SAT scores. 
Vector Dvstyj consists of variables that capture two different types of heterogeneity in 
group j’s member characteristics – in demography and in knowledge, ability, or skill. We use 
two variables to measure gender composition of a group, which are defined as Malegroup = max 
{0, proportion of male students- 50%} and Femalegroup = max {0, 50% - proportion of male 
students}. These variables are constructed to indicate the degree of male dominance and female 
dominance within a group
20. We use the standard deviation of group members’ ages, to measure 
                                                 
20 Initially, we constructed a variable to measure group gender diversity by taking the absolute value of the 
difference between proportion of male members in a group and 50%. Since this variable showed significant impact 
over group performance, we further constructed these two variables to separate the effects of male and female 
dominance on group performance. age diversity within a group. This variable also reflects the differences in members’ knowledge 
levels within a group
21. The standard deviations of SAT scores are computed for every group as 
measures of skill diversity, and the proportion of domestic Caucasian students within a group is 
used to indicate racial or ethnic heterogeneity
22. 
The first two columns in Table 3 present the estimates of the impact of group 
composition characteristics on group performance. Group average SAT scores had positive effect 
on group performance under both specifications but it is not significant in any of the 
specifications. Male dominant groups tend to perform worse in their group projects than mixed-
gender groups but female dominance did not affect group performance. These results indicate 
that gender diversity in groups possibly contributed to the successful performance in group 
projects.
23  
Three interpretations are possible for this gender effect.  First, it may simply mean that 
male students are lazier than female students on average.  Groups perform well if they have a 
couple of hard workers and mixed-gender or female-dominant groups may tend to satisfy this 
condition.  This interpretation is probably not completely true because male students do not 
perform significantly differently in exams as we show later.  Second, it may be the case that 
women are better in cooperating, organizing and coordinating activities and male-dominant 
groups are more likely to suffer coordination failures or free-riding.
 24  Third, male students may 
                                                 
21 We also used students’ college status to reflect on knowledge diversity but age variable seems to be a better proxy 
of general experience and maturity and has more variation. Age and college status are highly correlated in our data 
set and we do not have any older “non-traditional” students.  
22 We used other measures of ethnic diversity as well, such as the number of different ethnic backgrounds within a 
group but did not see any substantial changes. 
23 We also estimated models with dummy variables controlling for all male and all female groups as well as groups 
with only one female and one male member instead of using our gender dominance variables.  Results are similar to 
the reported ones, indicating that all male groups and groups with only one female member perform worse in their 
group projects. 
24 We expected that, in addition to the teamwork capabilities discussed, female students might have better writing, 
composition and verbal skills that may be especially helpful in writing the group paper. A cursory look at the be more motivated to work hard in the presence of female students. This may be due to 
competing for the attention of female students in the group or being more susceptible to peer 
pressure from female students when students socialize within groups. 
Although we cannot directly differentiate between these three possible interpretations of 
gender effect found in our results, we conjecture that the gender effect explained by the second 
interpretation may diminish as students get older.  More mature and advanced male students may 
have better coordination and organization skills than their yournger counterparts. Thus, we may 
expect the impact of gender diversity on group performance to be more prominent for younger 
male students who need the assistance of female students in organizing teamwork. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we add interaction terms between malegroup, femalegroup and average age 
of a group.  The second column in Table 3 reports the OLS regression results obtained by adding 
these interaction terms. According to the results, the coefficient for the interaction term of male 
group and group average age is positive and statistically significant; showing that male 
dominance in younger groups was especially damaging to group performance, thus, indicating 
the importance of maturity in successful teamwork. The role of maturity is also apparent in the 
female dominant groups as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
the interaction term between female group and group average age.  The latter result, however, 
implies that female dominance is particularly valuable in older teams.  Additional results 
presented in the first two columns of Table 3 show that age and racial diversity measures do not 
have any significant effect on group performance.  Further, we do not find any significant effect 
of group size on group performance. Thus, the claim that groups with 5 members may face 
                                                                                                                                                             
differences among genders in SAT verbal and SAT math scores in our sample indicated that female and male 
students performed similarly in the verbal section of the SAT, however, male students’ math scores were statistically 
significant and higher than the female students’ math scores.     greater danger of free-riding and coordination difficulties relative to smaller groups is not 
supported. 
An important feature of our data set is that groups choose their governance structures by 
signing either democratic or autonomous contract types. It is thus natural to ask whether the 
contract types have significant impact over group performance. The democratic governance form 
implements a mechanism to punish free-riders and reward hard workers within a group. It 
defines an incentive system for group members to work harder; shirking can result in lower 
project grade based on other team members’ evaluations in the end of the semester. Such 
punishment and reward mechanism does not exist in an autonomous group. The last two columns 
in Table 3 present results including the contract choice variable. According to these results, 
teams with democratic governance form performed better in group projects. However, we are 
concerned that the effect of contract choice on group performance may be overestimated due to 
the likely endogeneity of the contract choice variable – the same unobservable factors that affect 
group performance may also influence a group’s contract choice. For example, an individual 
who expects to work less for the course may insist on the choice of autonomous contact type 
where free riders are less likely to be punished; at the same time, groups with such potential free-
riders are likely to perform poorer. This endogeneity issue will be addressed in a later section by 
utilizing an endogenous treatment effect regression model.  
 
B. Knowledge spillovers and group learning 
In this section, we address the extent of knowledge spillovers from groups to individual 
group members. We investigate which group characteristics may have contributed to the learning and personal growth of individual members. We model individual performance in exams using 
the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification with class fixed effects: 
    (2)  ijk k j j i ijk Class Dvsty X Z IndScore η α β γ + + + + =     
Subscript i is the index for the i
th student in the sample. Vector Zi consists of individual level 
control variables including age, gender dummy, SAT score, and off campus housing dummy 
variable.
 25 Xj is a vector of group level characteristics for group j which individual i belongs to. 
As in equation (1), the vector of Dvstyj includes group diversity measures in demography and 
knowledge. Classk is a vector of dummy variables accounting for class fixed effects. Individual 
performances of students are measured by IndScoreijk, which is the weighted average of the three 
exam scores – two midterms and one final.
26  
The first column in Table 4 reports the baseline regression results. An individual’s SAT 
score is a good indicator of how well he or she performed in the MGT100 exams. The effect is 
significant at 1% statistical level and robust across all alternative model specifications. A female 
student performed slightly better in exams than a comparable male student, although the 
difference is not statistically significant. Individual’s age also has a positive and significant effect 
over exam performance. Since age is highly correlated with college year level, the positive effect 
of age over course performance reflects an individual’s knowledge level– a higher level student 
has accumulated more relevant knowledge and experience, enabling him or her to outperform 
younger students in exams. An engineering dummy variable was included in the model, 
indicating students majoring in engineering fields. Results show that engineering students 
                                                 
25 Gender dummy = 1 for a male student and 0 for a female student. 
26 We also estimated an ordered probit model to take into account the possible non-linearity between performance 
measures and group and individual characteristics. Efforts to raise grades from 60 to 70 percent are likely to be 
different that efforts to raise grades from 80 to 90 percent. However, results of ordered probit estimation are 
qualitatively very similar to the OLS estimation and, thus, are not reported. performed better in exams compared to students from other majors.
27 These students generally 
performed better at answering math-intensive questions and were likely to have higher analytical 
skills that were beneficial in exam performance. 
 
Among variables indicating group characteristics, gender composition of the group an 
individual belonged to had noticeable influence over individual performance. Specifically, a 
student in a male-dominant group tended to do worse in exams compared to another student in a 
mixed-gender group. This finding is consistent with the previous results obtained using group 
level data. Mixed-gender teamwork improves performance in both group and individual tasks.  
In accordance with our earlier interpretations, it may be the case that enhanced organization and 
coordination within groups in the presence of female peers increase the knowledge spillovers. 
Or, this gender effect may be due to cross-gender socialization that better motivates both male 
and female students and leads to more learning through group work.  In addition, similar to the 
results obtained regarding the group work, we find that racial diversity of groups do not affect 
individual’s performance in the exams.  
We find evidence of knowledge spillovers from groups to individuals. In particular, the 
standard deviation of members’ ages within a group has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on member’s performance in exams. Age heterogeneity within a group reflects the 
differences in group members’ college year levels (i.e. knowledge accumulation in college), as 
                                                 
27 None of the other groups of students majoring in arts and sciences, fine art, architecture or business perform 
significantly differently from the rest of the students.  In other specifications we included a count variable indicating 
the number of different schools students in each group were majoring in, but this variable was never statistically 
significant. Our initial intuition was that group heterogeneity within major schools may increase the coordination 
and communication problems within groups, or on the contrary may contribute to the knowledge diversity. 
 well as the maturity of individuals.
28 When a group is composed of students from various 
knowledge levels, knowledge transfer is more likely to occur. Students who are more advanced 
can also take leadership and mentorship roles in their groups and facilitate knowledge transfer 
and contribute to improved exam performances.  In contrast, the standard deviation of SAT 
scores within groups has no impact on individual or group performance.  SAT scores reflect very 
basic analytical and cognitive skills which are much more correlated with students’ natural 
ability.  Such skills cannot be easily transferred through teamwork.   
While it may be trivial that SAT score is a good indicator of individual’s college 
coursework performance, we suspect that the impact of an individual’s knowledge and skill set 
prior to entering college (measured by SAT score) on his or her college performance diminishes 
over time and is replaced by newer knowledge set obtained through the learning process in 
college. To test this hypothesis we added an interaction term between individual’s SAT score 
and age while taking MGT100. This interaction term has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on exam performance, as presented in the second column of Table 4, providing evidence 
that the impact of SAT score over coursework performance diminishes over time as an individual 
advances in college. 
The third column in Table 4 reports regression results where the model includes the 
binary contract choice variable. Results indicate that individuals in democratic groups scored 
significantly higher in exams compared to students in autonomous groups, holding other 
observable factors constant. This is consistent with our earlier results on the impact of contract 
choice on group performance. Contract choice, however, is likely to be an endogenous variable 
and the estimated coefficient is likely biased upward when more able students are also more 
                                                 
28 We also measured age heterogeneity (and knowledge diversity) within groups using the ratio of maximum and 
minimum age among group members. This measure did not perform as well in our models. likely to choose a democratic governance structure where free-riders are punished and hard 
workers are awarded. We investigate the contract choice decision and its impact in a later section 
in more detail.  
 
C. Who benefits most from working in groups?   
As discussed earlier, we observe that students benefit from group work; specifically 
students who are in groups with age heterogeneity and with mixed-gender composition perform 
better in their exams. In this section, we investigate which students are likely to benefit most 
from working in heterogeneous groups. 
 As shown in the first column of Table 4, we observe evidence of knowledge spillovers 
from groups to individuals. Age heterogeneity in groups, reflecting differences in knowledge 
accumulation and in student maturity, has a significant positive impact in individual exam 
performance. To further explore the effect of group age heterogeneity on individual members’ 
performances, we raise the following two hypotheses: (1) knowledge flows from older students 
to younger students; and (2) more knowledge is transferred to students with lower skills or 
aptitude. Thus, although everyone benefits from age and knowledge diversity, younger and less 
able students are likely to benefit more from this experience.   
We expect the first hypothesis to be true for the following reason: older students may 
have already taken other courses with similar subject matter and they are more comfortable with 
the concepts that are taught in MGT100. Thus, they are able to assist younger students while 
working on homework and preparing for exams. In order to test this hypothesis, we included an 
interaction term between age of a student and the standard deviation in age in the group he or she 
participated. The results, presented in the fourth column of Table 4, shows that this interaction term is positive and statistically significant, thus, suggesting that older students, not the younger 
ones, benefit more from age heterogeneity in groups and that knowledge flow within groups is 
not as simple as hypothesized. One explanation for this effect is that older students may take 
more of a mentorship and leadership roles within groups and assisting other students actually 
may create bigger benefits to these students in terms of better understanding of the material. It is 
also possible that older students are expected to take more of a leadership role and thus work 
harder to avoid looking incompetent. 
The second hypothesis, more knowledge is transferred to students with lower skills or 
aptitude, is not so trivial because it is also possible that smarter students pick up more knowledge 
from group work. But casual conversation with a number of students revealed a belief that group 
discussion of homework assignments was a helpful way to prepare for exams.  If a group makes 
sure that its members all understand the solutions to homework, the students with lowest 
analytical and problem-solving skills are likely to benefit most from such group work. To test 
this hypothesis, we added an interaction term between SAT score of a student and the standard 
deviation in age in the group he or she participated. The results presented in column 5 of Table 4 
shows that the coefficient of this interaction term is negative and significant, thus supporting our 
hypothesis.        
Next, we examine who benefits most from high knowledge spillover in mixed-gender 
groups.  In Section A, we already obtained a support for our hypothesis that the negative effect 
of male dominance decreases as students get older possibly because older and more advanced 
male students may have better coordination and organization skills that female students might 
generally bring in to group work, or because more mature male students are less likely to be 
motivated just by socialization with female students in groups.  In accordance with this earlier result, we expect to see a positive coefficient for the interaction term between age of a student 
and male dominance in the group he or she belonged.  The results presented in Column 6 of 
Table 4 confirm our prediction.  
Finally, we raise the following hypothesis: If some male students are motivated by the 
presence of female students, then smarter male students may be most affected by this gender 
incentive since smarter male students are more likely to out-perform their male peers. To test this 
hypothesis, we add an interaction term between male group and individual SAT score. The 
coefficient of this interaction term, as shown in the last column of Table 4, is negative and 
statistically significant at 5% level supporting our hypothesis.  Note, however, that this result is 
not necessarily inconsistent with our other explanation of the gender effect: female students are 
more likely to bring in organizational and coordination skills that facilitate group work than male 
students.  If analytical and problem-solving skills are complementary with organization and 
coordination skills because the latter facilitates knowledge transfer, students with high SAT 
scores benefit more by having someone who can better organize and coordinate study group 
activities.       
 
D. What group characteristics influence groups’ governance choice and what is the impact 
of governance choice on group performance?  
As discussed earlier, a novel feature of our dataset is the choice of governance structures 
by group members at the start of the semester. We first find out which group characteristics 
influenced the group governance choice, then, we estimate the impact of group contract choice 
on performance. In order to identify the group characteristics that affected the choice of 
governance form, the following probit model is estimated: (3)        j j j j j TA Dvsty X Contract ω α β + + + =
*
Let Contractj be the dummy variable for group j’s contract choice; Contractj = 1 if group j chose 
democratic or management governance structure, Contractj = 0 if the group chose autonomous 
contract.  The Probit model assumes that Contractj =1 if Contractj 
* ≥ 0 and Contractj = 0 if 
Contractj 
* < 0.  
As discussed earlier, the same unobservable factors that influence group performance 
may also influence a group’s contract choice. Thus, to address this endogeneity issue, we 
constructed an instrumental variable, TA influence, for the group contract choice, using TAs’ 
responses to the following brief questionnaire we sent in October 2005 to all the TAs of the 
MGT100 classes in 2003 and 2004
29:  
During Friday sessions, did you discuss the positive aspects of the democratic or 
manager-led group contract  (contract choice that allows unequal point allocation within 
group) or talk about your positive experience with these types of contracts (e.g. you 
actually punished your teammate who did not work well)? 
 
TAs were asked to rate their answers in the 5-point Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree).  Such variable can serve as a potential instrument because TAs’ discussions 
about the effectiveness of different group contracts and their experience in previous years are 
less likely to be correlated with factors that affect students’ performance or their group 
characteristics. The TA influence variable was constructed by adding up the responses from the 
two TAs who took charge of the subsection that each group belonged to.  Hence, the variable 
takes integer value in the range between 0 and 10 – the higher value indicting higher 
encouragement by TAs to choose the democratic contract.  
                                                 
29 In order to make sure that the TAs’ responses were precise reflections of their influence, we only considered the 
responses from the TAs for the three most recent classes (one class in 2003 and two classes in 2004).  Since TA influence was shown to be a significant indicator of groups’ contract choices in 
our Probit model estimation, we use it as an instrument to the contract choice in the group 
performance models. We consider the contract choice as an endogenous binary treatment 
variable over the outcome variable of group performance, and hence, used robust maximum 
likelihood estimation method.
30. This method considers the effect of an endogenously chosen 
binary treatment (contract choice) on another endogenous continuous variable (group 
performance), conditional on two different sets of independent variables.  
Results of the Probit model, without the TA influence as an explanatory variable, are 
reported in the first two columns of panel A of Table 5.  Average age has a negative and 
significant coefficient in these first specifications implying that groups with younger students are 
more likely to choose the democratic team contract.  One explanation is that younger students 
who have had less experience in group work and typically are more concerned about their grades 
may be more risk-averse and choose democratic governance form as a safeguard to protect 
themselves from possible free-riding.  Another plausible story is that older students knowing that 
they have many other competing tasks (e.g. job hunting, leadership roles in student organizations 
or fraternities, etc.) may expect to put forth less time and effort into the course than younger 
students and selfishly support the choice of the autonomous team contract.   
The second column reports the Probit estimation results including the interaction term 
between group average SAT score and average age. The inclusion of this interaction term 
reflects our expectation that the age effect discussed above will be mitigated if group members 
are more capable. Smart young students may not require a safeguard against free-riding knowing 
that they can finish projects alone even if they are aware of the risk.  Smart older students might 
prefer the democratic team contract knowing that they can still contribute to the group work with 
                                                 
30 Heckman’s two-step method was also adopted with similar results. their greater knowledge and skills even if they have tighter time constraint.  The coefficient for 
this interaction term is positive and significant at 10% level supporting our prediction.   
Results in the second column of Panel A indicate that groups with 5 members were more 
likely to choose the autonomous governance form, holding all other factors constant. This result 
appears to be counter-intuitive at first glance: we may expect group members in a larger group to 
be keener on selecting the contract type that punishes free-riding behavior, i.e., a democratic type 
since free-riding behavior tends to be more prominent in larger groups. However, the 
consequences of free-riding behavior are likely to be dissimilar for different size groups.  In a 
three-member group, cooperation of all members is critical and the effects of potential free riding 
by any member is detrimental.  As a result, a small group may prefer to choose the explicit 
punishment mechanism that safeguards its members against free riding.  In contrast, in a five-
member team where students might feel that they have more members than necessary, they may 
conclude that trust, implicit agreement, or peer pressure are sufficient to achieve their goal and 
get the task completed because shirking by one or two students is not so damaging. Such groups 
will choose the autonomous type to promote the sense of unity or partnership.  
The results of the first stage of the treatment effect MLE (i.e. contract choices based on 
group characteristics) are in columns 3 and 4 and show that TA influence was an important 
factor in the choice of the group governance structure. If the TAs discussed the positive aspects 
of a democratic (or manager-led) type of governance form before students chose group contract, 
groups were more likely to choose the democratic governance form. TA influence was especially 
prominent in one professor’s class (professor dummy = 0) which was held in fall 2004 while the 
variable does not have much impact in the other professor’s class (professor dummy = 1) which 
were offered in spring 2003 and spring 2004.  We believe that TA influence is a much noisier measure for earlier classes because most TAs in spring 2003 and some TAs in spring 2004 noted 
that they did not remember the details of their discussion on group governance structures 
although they answered the question to the best of their knowledge.
31
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of the second stage that includes the similar set of 
control variables as in the first stage plus the contract choice as a treatment variable. After 
controlling for the endogeneity of the treatment variable (contract choice) using TAs’ responses, 
a democratic group performed significantly better than its autonomous counterpart. The 
coefficient of the treatment variable (contract choice) is statistically significant at 5% level, and 
on average a democratic group obtained about 5 points (out of 100 points) higher on group 
project work compared to an autonomous group, holding all other group characteristics constant. 
Group members had motivation to work harder in order to avoid punishment associated with 
shirking under democratic governance form that punishes free riders and rewards hard workers; 
while in autonomous groups, such motivation does not exist and individual productivity could be 
further discouraged by potential free riding activities.  
The rest of the results presented in Panel B of Table 5 are mostly consistent with our 
earlier results on group performance.  Male dominant groups tend to perform worse in their 
group projects than mixed-gender groups, although the result is not always significant.  Based on 
our earlier hypothesis that the effect of male dominance decreases as students get older because 
older and more advanced male students may have better coordination and organization skills 
similar to female students, we included the interaction terms between malegroup, femalegroup 
and average age of a group.  The coefficient for the interaction term between malegroup and 
group’s average age was positive and statistically significant; indicating that negative effect of 
                                                 
31 In the questionnaire, we requested the TAs to state honestly if they could not remember or were not sure about the 
answer to the question.  male dominance is moderated for groups with older students.  Again, racial diversity measure 
has no impact on group performance.  An interesting result is that group average SAT scores 
now have positive and statistically significant effects on group performance under both 
specifications, indicating that smarter students tend to perform better in group assignments.  This 




Our research implies that forming groups with mixed gender and some age differences is 
desirable in certain educational environments. If this result holds in many classroom 
environments, the shift to coeducation in American higher education and secondary schools in 
the second half of the 19
th century likely facilitated learning and was beneficial to students, 
especially to male students, under the assumption that students were often given chances to 
participate in teamwork and encouraged to study in groups.
32 One current successful example 
that is consistent with our story of learning through age diversity is Montessori schools. The 
Montessori method employs multi-age classes, where older children may help younger ones, and 
the younger children are able to observe, learn from, and be inspired by their older peers.   
Although we find significant gender and age diversity in group work, we detect no effect of 
racial diversity.  
Our study also provides interesting evidence on how diversity improves the learning 
process. First, we find that older students benefit more from age diversity. This is counter-
intuitive because we normally expect knowledge to flow from older and more experienced 
people to younger and less experienced ones. We offer two explanations: (1) older students 
                                                 
32 Details on the history of education in the United States can be found in Goldin (1999). might learn more through their mentorship and leadership roles; and (2) older students work 
harder to avoid looking incompetent in their leadership role. Second, we find that smarter 
students benefit more from gender diversity.  Although it is not necessarily counter-intuitive, this 
again allows multiple interpretations: (1) the analytical and problem-solving skills smart male 
students bring in to group work may be complementary with organization skills many women 
possess; or (2) smarter male students, knowing that they can outperform other male students, 
may be more motivated to work hard to attract attention of female members.  Although these 
explanations are speculative, these findings at least suggest that learning process and learning 
incentives are not so simple and require further research. 
Our paper also provides additional empirical evidence for the importance of governance 
form chosen for teamwork. Although previous work mostly studied the effect of pay schemes, 
what is important is the expectation that free-riders will be punished. According to our results, 
adopting the democratic group contract, which enables group members to punish free-riders 
effectively by differentiated point allocation, improved the scores on group project and group 
homework assignments by approximately 5 points (out of 100 points) on average compared to an 
autonomous group, holding all other group characteristics constant. What is important, however, 
is the expectation of punishment rather than actual punishment. Our data show that 32 out of 60 
democratic groups actually adopted equal point allocation.
33     
  Overall, our study confirms the notion that teamwork output is the result of multiple 
mechanisms that may interact, and that diversity in skills, knowledge, and demographic 
characteristics affect individual and group performance through multiple channels. Therefore, 
                                                 
33 In most instances of differentiated point allocation, the maximum punishment (10 points deduction) was imposed 
on one student and these 10 points were reallocated equally among the rest of the team members.  managers and teachers need to choose group member composition and governance mechanisms 
carefully since these factors affect both the benefits and costs of teamwork.    
Table 1 
Group Work Schedule for Management 100 in Fall 2004 
 
 
Friday, September 3    Group members are selected. 
 
  Friday, September 10    Choose and sign a group contract.   
 
Friday, September 17   Work on the group assignment #1. 
 
Friday, September 24   Group assignment #1 is due.  
 
Friday, October 1    Select team books and develop project work plan. 
 
Thursday, October 7    Midterm #1. 
 
Friday, October 15    Work on the group assignment #2.  
 
Friday, October 22    Fall Break 
 
Friday, November 5  Start working on a group outline for your paper. 
 
Thursday, November 11  Midterm #2. 
 
Friday, November 12   Have a group outline ready to discuss with TA’s.  
 
Friday, November 19   Start writing the introduction of the paper.   
Work on the group assignment #3. 
 
Friday, November 26   Thanksgiving Holiday 
 
Friday, December 3    Discuss the introduction and the first draft of group paper.  
 
Friday, December 10    Paper and Presentations due 
 











        
Individual Level Variables (Number of Observations: 431) 
   Standard     
   Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
        
Individual Exam Score  81.60  8.63  43.15  99.77 
Age 19.25  1.08  17.17  25.08 
SAT Score  1377.73  93.48  1010  1600 
Gender* (male=1)  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Ethnicity* (white=1)  0.67  0.47  0  1 
Engineering student*  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Off Campus*  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Contract*(Democratic=1) 0.59  0.49  0  1 
College Status**  1.46  0.81  1  4 
              
*: Dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if an observation satisfies the criterion   
**: The variable "college status" takes values 1 to 4 corresponding to the status of freshman to senior. 
        
Group Level Variables (Number of Observations: 102) 
   Standard    
   Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
        
Group Performance Score  88.89  5.11  70.26  100 
Group Size  4.25  0.74  2  5 
Average Age  19.29  0.74  18.25  21.48 
Standard Deviation of Age  0.67  0.45  0.06  2.46 
Average Gender Composition  0.56  0.19  0  1 
Average SAT Score  1375.61  55.55  1175  1480 
Standard Deviation of SAT Scores  71.09  30.88  17.85  169.17 
Proportion of White Students  0.68  0.24  0.20  1 
Off Campus Dummy*  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Engineer Dummy*  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Contract (Democratic = 1)  0.60  0.49  0  1 
TA influence**  7.93  1.08  6  10 
              
*: Off campus dummy takes the value of 1if a group has at least one member living off campus. 
*: Engineer dummy takes the value of one if a group has at least one Engineering student.   
**: TA influence measure takes the value from 0 to 10 for each group; higher value corresponds to higher influence.  
Table 3 
Relationship between Group Characteristics and Group Performances 
OLS Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Group Performance Score (GroupScorei) 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Interaction  between    
  Baseline Model  Age and Gender  Including Contract Choice 
Variable     Composition       
        
Average SAT  0.021  0.027  0.018  0.026 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Standard Deviation of SAT  -0.006  -0.008  -0.013  -0.014 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Male Group  -6.959*  -8.283**  -5.615  -6.797* 
 (4.116)  (3.997)  (4.242)  (4.066) 
Female Group  2.939  -2.879  9.071  3.991 
 (5.063)  (5.135)  (5.719)  (7.001) 
Proportion of White Students  1.700  0.822  1.100  0.294 
 (2.550)  (2.585)  (2.470)  (2.473) 
Average Age  -0.520  -1.486  0.156  -0.676 
 (1.572)  (1.724)  (1.673)  (1.827) 
Standard Deviation of Age  -0.154  -1.457  0.785  -0.909 
 (1.651)  (1.886)  (1.626)  (1.840) 
Group Size Dummy  0.769  -0.866  0.968  1.230 
 (1.065)  (1.061)  (1.202)  (1.207) 
Engineer Dummy  0.872  0.919  0.431  0.341 
 (1.176)  (1.129)  (1.198)  (1.173) 
Malegroup*Average age    10.663**    13.045** 
   (5.299)    (5.180) 
Femalegroup*Average age    12.832**    10.171 
   (6.389)    (7.056) 
Contract Choice      3.231**  3.505** 
     (1.464)  (1.512) 
        
Prob>F 0.0852  0.0042  0.0111  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1950  0.2339  0.2810  0.3303 
Root MSE  4.9138  4.8491  4.8384  4.7349 
Number of observations  102  102  87  87 
              
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively. 
Each regression also includes dummies for each class.       
The dummy variable contract choice takes the value of 1 for Democratic groups and 0 for Autonomous groups. 





 Table 4 (part 1) 
Knowledge Spillovers and Group Learning 
OLS Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Individual Exam Score (IndScorej) 
      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable Baseline  SAT*age  Contract 
SAT 0.029***  0.030***  0.029*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Age 1.099**  0.757  0.981* 
 (0.545)  (0.555)  (0.551) 
Gender -0.412  -0.403  0.314 
 (0.876)  (0.872)  (0.918) 
Ethnicity 0.369  0.475  -0.082 
 (0.916)  (0.909)  (0.955) 
Off Campus  1.788  1.451  2.001 
 (1.507)  (1.490)  (1.574) 
Engineering Student  2.545**  3.002***  1.934 
 (1.120)  (1.092)  (1.193) 
Average SAT  0.000  0.000  -0.008 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Standard Deviation of SAT  0.008  0.007  -0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Average Age  -1.455  -1.148  -1.277 
 (0.941)  (0.958)  (0.963) 
Standard Deviation of Age  2.618**  2.154*  3.470*** 
 (1.205)  (1.160)  (1.255) 
Male group  -9.824**  -10.833***  -9.167** 
 (3.843)  (3.824)  (3.722) 
Female Group  -6.724  -7.367  -0.236 
 (4.650)  (4.556)  (6.676) 
Proportion of White Students  -2.027  -2.044  -1.384 
 (2.266)  (2.232)  (2.344) 
Group Size Dummy  0.649  0.704  1.195 
 (0.932)  (0.915)  (1.094) 
SAT*Age   -0.007***   
   (0.002)   
Contract     2.559*** 
     (0.900) 
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.2090  0.2204  0.2287 
Root MSE  7.8405  7.7934  7.7692 
Number of observations  431  431  367 
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively.   
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported by accounting for potential dependence of individual observations within group. 
Each regression also includes dummies for each class.     
The dummy variable contract choice takes the value of 1 for Democratic groups and 0 for Autonomous groups. 
Both SAT and age are demeaned. Table 4 (part 2) 
Knowledge Spillovers and Group Learning 
OLS Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Individual Exam Score (IndScorej) 
 (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Who benefit most from group work? 
Variable Age*dage  Sat*dage  Age*Malegroup  SAT*Malegroup 
SAT  0.030*** 0.036*** 0.030***  0.037*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Age -0.488  0.970*  0.243  0.970* 
  (1.036) (0.566) (0.700)  (0.548) 
Gender  -0.409 -0.511 -0.339  -0.457 
  (0.879) (0.883) (0.880)  (0.884) 
Ethnicity  0.482 0.386 0.460  0.222 
  (0.920) (0.922) (0.902)  (0.910) 
Off  Campus  1.636 1.779 1.961  1.758 
  (1.502) (1.502) (1.496)  (1.499) 
Engineering Student  2.678**  2.904***  2.469**  2.716** 
  (1.133) (1.093) (1.069)  (1.078) 
Average SAT  0.000  -0.000  0.002  0.000 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Standard Deviation of SAT  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.006 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Average  Age  -0.836 -1.433 -0.753  -1.480 
  (1.035) (0.941) (1.032)  (0.943) 
Standard Deviation of Age  1.995  2.418**  1.836  2.555** 
  (1.254) (1.187) (1.248)  (1.194) 
Male  group  -10.742*** -10.130*** -10.282***  -10.425*** 
  (3.900) (3.780) (3.669)  (3.807) 
Female  Group  -7.030 -7.076 -7.020  -7.160 
  (4.480) (4.586) (4.497)  (4.560) 
Proportion of White Students  -2.205  -1.866  -2.250  -1.807 
  (2.247) (2.263) (2.201)  (2.217) 
Group Size Dummy  0.757  0.672  0.703  0.551 
  (0.917) (0.927) (0.921)  (0.925) 
Age* Standard Deviation of Age  1.270*       
 (0.671)       
SAT*Standard Deviation of Age  -0.009*     
   (0.005)     
Age*Male  Group    5.506*   
    (2.850)   
SAT*Male  Group      -0.060** 
      (0.028) 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared  0.2163 0.2121 0.2182  0.2165 
Root MSE  7.814  7.8347  7.8046  7.8129 
Number  of  observations  431 431 431  431 
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively.   
Robust standard errors (in the parentheses) are reported by accounting for potential dependence of individual observations within group. 
Each regression also includes dummies for each class. Both SAT and age are demeaned.       
The dummy variable contract choice takes the value of 1 for Democratic groups and 0 for Autonomous groups. Table 5 (Panel A) 
The impact of Group characteristics on Contract Choice 
Treatment Effect Model Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
        
Panel A: Treatment Effect Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Contract Choice (1=Democratic, 0=Autonomous) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Probit Model   Probit Model  Treatment Effect MLE 
Variables  Baseline  Asat*aage   Include TA influence  
        
Average SAT  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Male Group  -0.527  0.231  0.204  0.259 
 (1.305)  (1.406)  (1.533)  (1.538) 
Female Group  1.470  1.510  2.076  2.550 
 (1.613)  (1.622)  (3.378)  (2.772) 
Average Age  -0.647*  -0.700**  -0.486  -0.459 
 (0.346)  (0.353)  (0.505)  (0.518) 
Standard Deviation of Age  -0.681  -0.560  -0.438  -0.478 
 (0.426)  (0.425)  (0.457)  (0.453) 
Group Size Dummy  -0.479  -0.637*  -0.971**  -0.987** 
 (0.362)  (0.372)  (0.394)  (0.396) 
Engineering Student Dummy  0.668*  0.575  0.994**  0.967** 
 (0.342)  (0.361)  (0.461)  (0.453) 
Professor Dummy  0.913  0.726  4.247**  4.374** 
 (0.587)  (0.632)  (2.072)  (2.193) 
Average SAT* Average Age    0.010*  0.009*  0.010* 
   (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
TA Influence††     0.463**  0.454** 
     (0.191)  (0.198) 
TA*Prof Dummy      -0.510**  -0.532** 
     (0.237)  (0.256) 
        
Prob>chi2 0.0104  0.0133  0.1889  0.2669 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1743  0.2057     
Number of Observations† 87  87  81  81 
              
†: For the treatment effect model the number of observations is 81 groups (instead of 87 groups for the Probit model) since only data from 
three most recent classes were included in the regression analysis.  
††: The variable "TA influence" measures how much the TAs discussed the positive aspects of Democratic governance form. 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively. 
The dummy variable contract choice takes the value of 1 for Democratic groups and 0 for Autonomous groups. 
The results are robust using two-step estimates instead of MLE method.     







 Table 5 (Panel B) 
The Impact of Contract Choice on Group Performance 
Treatment Effect Model Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
    
Panel B: Group Performance Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Group Performance Score (GroupScorei) 
 (3)  (4) 
Variables  Treatment Effect MLE 
   Including Asat*aage in first step 
Average SAT  0.022*  0.030** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Standard Deviation of SAT  -0.014  -0.013 
 (0.018)  (0.017) 
Male Group  -4.516  -6.796* 
 (4.032)  (3.914) 
Female Group  10.077  2.676 
 (6.250)  (6.454) 
Proportion of White Students  0.250  -0.434 
 (2.482)  (2.431) 
Average Age  -0.176  -1.087 
 (1.625)  (1.709) 
Standard Deviation of Age  0.290  -1.109 
 (1.626)  (1.632) 
Group Size Dummy  0.953  1.162 
 (1.021)  (1.022) 
Engineering Student Dummy  1.048  0.953 
 (1.150)  (1.128) 
Professor Dummy  -0.120  0.398 
 (2.076)  (2.184) 
Contract Choice  4.987**  4.837** 
 (2.201)  (2.226) 
Male Group*Average Age    11.779** 
   (4.660) 
Female Group*Average Age    13.759** 
   (5.659) 
    
Wald Chi2  47.27  84.77 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000  0.0000 
Number of Observations† 81  81 
        
†: For the treatment effect model the number of observations is 81 groups (instead of 87 groups for the Probit model) since only data from 
three most recent classes were included in the regression analysis.  
††: The variable "TA influence" is the sum of two TAs’ responses, each one being a 5-point Likert scale that measures how much the TA 
discussed the positive aspects of Democratic governance form. 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively. 
The dummy variable contract choice takes the value of 1 for Democratic groups and 0 for Autonomous groups. 
Both Average SAT and Average Age are demeaned.     
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